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INTRODUCTION
The Association of American Law Schools Insurance Law
Section's 2008 meeting was devoted to an examination of insurance
intermediaries. Intermediaries play a critical middleman role in the
distribution and operations of insurance. Besides bringing insureds and
insurers together, intermediaries also provide advice to insureds, gather
underwriting information for insurers, and generally help facilitate the
relationship between insured and insurers all the way through the claims
process. Despite the critical importance of intermediaries, judicial
decisions considering the duties, obligations, and loyalties of intermediaries
have left the law muddied and insureds largely unprotected.
In 2004, the New York Attorney General launched an investigation
into whether the common compensation schemes offered to insurance
intermediaries by insurers had induced intermediaries to improperly steer
their clients' insurance business to those insurers paying the most lucrative
commissions, without regard to their client's interests. New York's
investigation raised the question of whether the longstanding practice of
paying brokers contingent commissions undermined broker loyalty and
tainted the broker-insured relationship. The investigation and its aftermath
revealed the vulnerabilities of insureds to the undisclosed practices of
insurers and intermediaries. Impoverished case law on the loyalties and
duties owed by intermediaries to insureds, together with ignorance about
the conflicts raised by compensation and contingent commissions likely
exacerbated the problem. Thus, the time to look more closely at
intermediaries was long overdue.
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This article explores the role of the intermediary in the context of
insurance in order to introduce reflections on intermediaries presented by
Professors Jeffrey Stempel, Daniel Schwarcz, and others at the 2008 AALS
program. Daniel Schwarcz considers the problems of compensation
schemes in the context of both commercial and personal lines of
insurance. 1 Jeffrey Stempel examines the relatively unexamined role of
intermediaries employed after the formation of the insurance contract,
including so-called independent claims adjusters and managing general
agents.2
Part II discusses the various methodologies employed to
understand the legal relationship of intermediaries to insurers and insureds.
It concludes that principles of agency law do not provide a particularly
helpful framework to understand the legal relationships among insured,
insurer, and their intermediary because the intermediary's role, even in a
single transaction, is inconstant.
Part III discusses judicial treatment of claims against
intermediaries. It finds the outcomes are fact-driven and unpredictable; it
is often difficult for courts to determine to whom an intermediary owes its
duties. It observes that courts frequently impose a relatively low standard
of care toward insureds upon intermediaries. The majority of courts apply
a low standard of care even to those intermediaries who are deemed
brokers working for the insured, and captive and independent agents have
even lesser obligations. The judicial treatment of intermediaries is out of
step with the pro-insured treatment courts generally adopt in disputes
between insurers and insureds.
Part IV then briefly considers whether contingent commissions
paid by insurers to intermediaries add further mischief to already confused
legal relationships. It introduces two views to be considered.
Professor Daniel Schwarcz contends that dangers indeed exist,
particularly the temptations of improper steering, and that disclosure of
intermediary compensation schemes to insureds is not sufficiently
I Daniel Schwarcz, Differential Compensation and the "Race to the Bottom"
in Consumer Insurance Markets, 15 CoNN. INS. L.J. 878 (forthcoming).
2 Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Other Intermediaries: The Increasingly
Anachronistic Immunity of Managing General Agents and Independent Claims
Adjusters, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 741 (forthcoming).
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protective.3 Schwarcz posits that even if "consumers understand their
intermediaries face a potential conflict" they cannot on their own "police
the quality of the advice they receive from their intermediaries or ...
calculate the expected costs of this limitation."4 Schwarz believes that
disclosure is insufficient even in the commercial insurance market with
sophisticated insureds, because even equipped with that disclosure,
insureds will lack a means to protect themselves.5 Schwarcz proposes
methods to reduce or eliminate the conflicts raised by compensation,
including perhaps by moving away from differential compensation in the
consumer insurance markets altogether.6
On the other hand, insurance insider Sean Fitzpatrick contends that
we should not abandon the contingent commission scheme, rather that
adding the safeguards of mandatory disclosure of compensation practices
should suffice.7 Fitzpatrick argues that the incidents of improper steering
and the conflicts raised by contingent commissions are exaggerated.8
Moreover, he views contingent commission schemes as beneficial to
consumers, because they encourage intermediaries to consider "long-term"
performance of insurers.9
3 Daniel Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure: The Case for Banning Contingent
Commissions, 25 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 289, 324 (2007) (concluding that
contingent commissions should be banned in the consumer market and possibly
banned in the commercial market as well).
Id. at 323.
Id. at 325-26.
6 Schwarcz, Differential Compensation, supra note 1.
7 Sean M. Fitzpatrick, The Small Laws: Eliot Spitzer and the Way to Market
Reform, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3067-71 (2006) (calling for voluntary
disclosure of compensation mechanisms). Sean M. Fitzpatrick is employed within
the insurance industry. He currently holds a Senior Vice President position with
The Chubb Corporation.
8 Id. at 3061-62.
Id. at 3061.
2009]
574 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2
Part V briefly comments on Jeffrey Stempel's viewpoint on
outsourced independent adjusters and managing general agents - those
intermediaries employed by insurers to facilitate insurance functions after
the policy has been issued. He notes that bottom line interests have made
outsourcing these insurance tasks more common. Stempel cautions that
although these intermediaries carry out important functions associated with
insurance, the lack of regulation and a lack of viable legal theories
(particularly bad faith) against downstream intermediaries leaves them
largely immunized for their own errors. Stempel argues that expanding tort
liability to outsourced adjusters and administrators will improve
accountability, advance public policy, and enhance the effective operation
of the insurance market.'
Discussions about the legal status of intermediaries, the conflicts of
interest they encounter, and their potential liability to insureds has been
little explored or understood. Their role in the marketing, processing, and
management of insurance is vital and increasing.
I. CLASSIFICATION OF INTERMEDIARIES
Insurers have access to a wide "variety of marketing channels.""
These channels include direct marketing to buyers, through means such as
soliciting by Internet, mail, and company employees. 12 To a large extent,
however, insurers rely on insurance intermediaries of various kinds to sell
their products. 13
In direct writing, the insurer does not utilize an intermediary, but
engages in mass merchandising of its own insurance products.14 Direct
10 Stempel, supra note 2, at 741.
11 See J. David Cummins & Neil A. Doherty, The Economics of Insurance
Intermediaries, 73 J. Risk & Ins. 359, 360 (2006). See also Background on
Insurance Intermediaries, 2004 Ins. Info. Inst. 4 , available at
http://server.iii.org/yyobjdata/binary/77420610/Insurancelntermediaries.doc.
12 See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 360; Background on Insurance
Intermediaries, supra note 11, at 4.
13See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 360 (stating "the vast majority
of commercial [property and casualty] insurance sales involves an intermediary").
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writers are employees of the insurer, working as the insurer's sales force
and representing only the insurance company. With a direct writer, there is
often no face-to-face contact with a prospective insured, and no local agent.
Instead, communications are through employees, and via phone, mail, fax,
and Internet. Direct writers are simply the insurer's own sales force.
Often, however, insurers use intermediaries to sell insurance, and
to bring insurers and prospects together. These intermediaries perform an
essential service in the insurance market that enables both the insured and
the insurer to transact business. Intermediaries may be labeled as "captive
agents," agents that principally sell the products of a single company;
"independent agents" that typically sell for several insurers; 15 and brokers,
that are engaged by insureds to procure insurance on their behalf. Brokers
"tend to service larger and more complicated business insurance needs."'
16
Large brokers, with a global reach, are "highly concentrated" and "the bulk
of commercial [property and casualty] lines for the large and international
buyer segment of the market is placed by a small number of brokers for
each of whom it is their biggest source of revenue."'
' 7
While there are numerous ways to classify intermediaries, each
merely describes aspects of their role. Commentator Sean Fitzpatrick
observes, "[i]ndeed, one can hardly locate an in-depth legal analysis of the
broker-agent distinction that does not feature words such as 'blurry' or
'cloudy.'," 8 Determining what intermediaries do and for whom they work
has not leant itself to easy answers; definitive characterizations have been
illusive. The intermediary's relationship with the insurer and the insured
must often be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Among the ways to characterize intermediaries are a) by the
exclusivity-independence they have established in their contractual
relations with insureds and insurers; b) by the extent to which the insurer's
mode of market distribution utilizes intermediaries; and c) by principles of
14 Laureen Regan & Sharon Tennyson, Agent Discretion and the Choice of
Insurance Marketing System, 39 J. L. & EcoN. 637, 638, 640 (1996).
15 Robert H. Jerry, Understanding Insurance Law 64 (3d ed. 2002).
16 Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 361.
17 Id. at 363, 367.
18 Fitzpatrick, supra note 7, at 3054.
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agency law, including the nature of the agent's authority vis-A-vis the
insured or insurer. However, as described below, while these classification
exercises may help us understand the role of the intermediary, each does
little to help us understand the legal relationship between the intermediary,
the insurer, and the insured.
Characterization of intermediaries by the independence or
exclusivity they maintain is often unsatisfactory because the actual
relationship an intermediary has with insurers and insureds may be less
categorical.' 9 Many are neither strictly exclusive agents working for an
insurer nor strictly independent agents working for an insured. For
example, a "captive" agent is one who purportedly sells for a single insurer
and ought to be the most clearly an agent of the insurer. Yet a captive
agent may sell insurance products of other companies in some
circumstances.20 Moreover, by conduct directed toward the insured, a
captive agent may transform from an agent of the insurer to one for the
insured in a particular case.2 '
Just as captives may not be strictly captive, "independent" agents
are in fact be less independent than that label implies. Although agents are
called "independent," implying that they are free from ties to any particular
insurance company, independent agents usually sell only for a handful of
insurers with whom they have agency appointment contracts.22
Importantly, although they have the independence to place insurance with
19 See, e.g., Quirk v. Anthony, 563 So.2d 710, 712 (Fla. App. 1990) (whether
an agent works for insured or insurer presented a triable issue of fact).
20 Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 361. Captive agents may be
employees or independent contractors. Regan & Tennyson, supra note 14, at 637-
38 (1996).
21 See Campbell v. Valley State Agency, 407 N.W.2d 109, 112 (Minn. App.
1987) ("agent may undertake an affirmative duty by entering into a special
relationship with an insured").
22 In 2000, "the average independent insurance agency ... represented 7.3
personal lines insurers, 6.7 commercial lines insurers, and 4.8 life and health
carriers." JERRY, supra note 15, at 64.
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multiple insurers, they are not necessarily agents for the insured.23
Independent agents are vested with authority to perform certain acts for the
insurer and are paid commissions by the insurer based upon agreements
with particular insurers.24
Brokers, whose name implies that they work for the insured and
negotiate contracts on the insured's behalf,25 are also not as independent as
their name implies. Brokers who purport to work for the insured also may
"place a significant portion of their business" under agency appointment
contracts.26 These contracts vest authority in brokers to perform certain
services for the insurer. This may be so even where the broker also charges
the insured a separate fee for their services.27 Thus, brokers in fact may be
working on behalf of both the insured and the insurer in a particular
transaction.28
Modes of market distribution may also help to characterize the role
of the intermediary. Modes of distribution tend to sort by the nature of the
lines sold.29 Personal lines, sold to consumers, are more frequently
distributed through direct marketing by insurance employees or through
23 See Watkins v. HRRW, LLC, No. 3:05-00279, 2006 WL 3327659, at *7
(M.D. Tenn. Nov. 14, 2006) (observing that independent agents may be agent of
the insured, but also for the insurer for some functions).
24 Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 374-78.
25 The dictionary defines a broker as "an agent middleman who for a fee or
commission negotiates contracts of purchase and sale... between buyers and
sellers..." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 281 (3d ed.
1981).
26 Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 361. See generally Md. Cas. Co. v.
J.M. Foster, 414 P.2d 672 (N.M. 1966) (agency agreements authorized
independent agent to bind and place insurance with four companies).
27 Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 376-79 (observing that fees charged
to insured clients are "offset by commissions").
28 See Almerico v. RLI Ins. Co., 716 So.2d 774, 776-77 (Fla. 1998) ("it is
equally well settled that an insurance broker may act in the dual capacity of broker
for insured and agent of the insurer").
29 See JERRY, supra note 15, at 64.
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captive and exclusive agencies.3° Commercial lines are more often
distributed through so-called independent agents and brokers. 3' Notably,
some insurers now market through several distribution channels, "blurring
the boundaries that used to exist among insurers based upon distribution. 32
Intermediaries may also be characterized by agency principles,
particularly by the intermediary's relationship to its principal, and the level
of authority vested in them. The problem here is that insurers vest varying
degrees of authority in agents, defying classification by their title. A
general agent, enjoying the broadest authority on behalf of an insurer, "is
authorized by an insurer to accept risks, to agree upon and settle the terms
of insurance policies, to issue and renew policies, and to modify or waive
the terms of existing policies., 33  "The powers of such an agent are
coextensive with the business entrusted to his care, authorizing him to act
for the principal in all matters coming within the usual and ordinary scope
and character of such business. 34
Insurers conduct much of their business through the use of
intermediaries with more limited authority. These limited authority agents
30 Id. (characterizing captive agents and insurance marketing through insurer
employees directly to buyers as examples of direct marketing).
31 See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 362 (noting that independent
agencies and brokers "control 32 percent of personal lines business" and 68
percent of commercial lines of property and casualty.); Regan & Tennyson, supra
note 14, at 653 (observing the dominance of exclusive agencies in personal lines
and dominance of independent agents in commercial lines). More specifically,
Firms which use tied sales [exclusive agents] agents sell nearly 80 percent of
life-health insurance but hold only a 45 percent market share in property-liability
insurance; the remainder of each of these markets is sold by firms using
independent sales agents. The distribution of market shares by organizational form
is also systematic within more narrow classes of insurance: for example,
independent agency firms sell only 35 percent of private passenger auto insurance
but control 65 percent of the commercial auto insurance market.
Id. at 638.
32 JERRY, supra note 15, at 65.
33 Douglas Richmond, Insurance Agent and Broker Liability, 40 ToRT TRIAL
& INS. PRAC. L.J. 1, 3 (2004).
34 Wash. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Strickland, 491 So. 2d 872, 874 (Ala. 1985).
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are "authorized to act for the principal only in a particular transaction or in
a particular way., 35 Agents with limited authority to bind insurers are
characterized as "special agents," and include "soliciting agents," who are
not authorized to bind the insurer, but are authorized only "to solicit
insurance, to take applications for insurance and forward them to the
company or its general agent, to deliver policies once issued by the insurer,
and to collect premiums. 36 Although agents with limited authority cannot
bind the principal beyond the scope of that authority, the principal may still
be liable for the agent's conduct, for example, when the agent commits
fraud under 'respondeat superior' principles.37
Characterizing the loyalties and duties of intermediaries by
examining the agent-principal relationship is imperfect at best, because
whether the insured or the insurer serves as the principal can depend on the
actual tasks performed. Intermediaries, both independent and exclusive,
perform valuable services that are desired and beneficial to both
prospective insureds and insurers.38 Thus, "[a]lthough an independent
agent or broker is normally an agent for the insured, for some purposes he
may be an agent for the insurer as well., 39 Determining for whom the
35 Id.
36 Richmond, supra note 33, at 4.
37 Washington, 491 So. 2d at 874-75.
38 Intermediaries can be characterized as "two-sided firms." Cummins &
Doherty, supra note 11, at 361 n.3.
Three conditions must be present in a two-sided market: (1) two distinct
groups of customers; (2) the value obtained by one group increases with the size of
the other; and (3) an intermediary connects the two. Coordination of two-sided
markets requires that this intermediary or "middleman" create a platform for the
groups to interact. The intermediary must ensure the existence of a critical mass on
both sides.
Timothy J. Muris, Payment Card Regulation and the (Mis)application of the
Economics of Two-sided Markets, 2005 COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 515, at 517. As a
result, each side of the market intermediaries bring together may to some extent
subsidize the other. Id.
39 Washington, 491 So. 2d at 875. See also Young v. Allstate, 812 N.E.2d
741, 752 (Ill. App. 2004) ("An independent broker may act as agent of the insurer
and insured in certain circumstances.").
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intermediary works in any given transaction at any point in time involves a
complicated factual inquiry.40 Determining for whom an intermediary
works may also require a factual analysis of how the intermediary was
engaged in this particular transaction.4'
Insurers utilize intermediaries not only to sell their products, but
also to gather information utilized during the underwriting process, and to
provide services on behalf of the insurer to insureds during the coverage
period.42 As Regan and Tennyson observe, to ensure profitability,
"insurer[s] must devise an effective method of classifying applicants. ' ' 3
Generally, when underwriting requires gathering more sophisticated or
complex risk information, insurers utilize the services of independent
agents rather than captive agents.44
40 See Richmond, supra note 33, at 7-9. Richmond comments that brokers
"may be an agent of the insured for purposes of obtaining coverage" but an agent
of the insurer for purposes such as "issuing policies, issuing certificates of
insurance, collecting premiums, and the like." Id. at 7-8.
41 See Young, 812 N.E.2d at 752 (quoting Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass'n v.
Gitelson, 801 N.E.2d 1064, 1068 (I11. App. Ct. 2003) (identifying four factors to
determine to whom a broker owes a duty as "1) who first set the agent in motion;
2) who controlled the agent's action; 3) who paid the agent; and 4) whose interests
the agent was protecting").)
42 Regan & Tennyson, supra note 14, at 638-39. As Regan & Tennyson
explain the agent's value in underwriting:
Although insurance sales agents do not typically participate in the
formal underwriting process, they frequently play an important role in
applicant risk assessment. The agent is the first contact the insurer has
with a potential policyholder and may be able to obtain information
about the consumer which would be difficult or costly for the firm to
verify. It is widely acknowledged that agents often employ subjective
criteria in evaluating insurance applicants. The agent's information may
then be used by the insurer in the decision regarding whether to insure,
or under what conditions to insure, an applicant.
Id. at 639.
4 3 Id. at 638.
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Prospective insureds also benefit from the expertise and labors of
intermediaries. A buyer, whether sophisticated or not, would be hard
pressed to intelligently compare characteristics of insurance products
beyond the premium charged without the expertise of an intermediary. For
example, nuances in policy language, insurer solvency, claims practices,
and reputation of the insurer are matters for which even sophisticated
insureds need the counsel of intermediaries. "[T]he buyer of insurance
faces the daunting task of first deciding what sort of insurance protection is
needed given the risks faced, and then comparing policies offering
alternative coverage at different prices from several insurers with different
levels of credit risk and reputations for claims settlement and policyholder
services. '  Buyers, thus, turn to intermediaries to "match buyers with
insurers who have the skill, capacity, risk appetite, and financial strength to
underwrite the risk, and then help the client select from competing
offers. 46
Despite their vital functions in the insurance market, the
inconstancy and vagueness of their legally prescribed allegiances is
problematic. In any given intermediary relationship, the intermediary, the
insured, and the insurer cannot be certain for whom the intermediary is
working. Each time, ad hoc, and without definitiveness, courts must ask if
the intermediary was working in their own self-interest, the interest of the
insured, or the interest of the insurer.
II. TREATMENT OF INSURANCE INTERMEDIARIES IN THE
COURTS
A. THE INTERMEDIARY'S STANDARD OF CARE
Although the relationships between insurer, intermediary, and
insured are complex and not easily categorized, cases have frequently
44Id. at 663. The authors explain that the advantage of utilizing independent
agents "arises because the independent agent's multiple placement opportunities
and ownership of policy expirations reinforce his incentives to participate in risk
assessment, thereby lowering the insurer's marginal cost of obtaining agent
information." Id.
45Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 359-60.
46 Id. at 360.
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adopted a relatively simplistic approach in disputes between insureds and
intermediaries. In litigation between intermediaries and their insureds,
little judicial attention is paid to the peculiar vulnerabilities of insureds,
even though these same courts have developed special protective rules to
protect insureds in the context of suits between insureds and insurers.
Professor James Fischer, explaining why insurance contracts
traditionally have been judged contractually by special rules, explains that
insurers enjoy such a uniquely superior position in the relationship that it is
proper to treat the insurer-insured contract differently than any other.47
There are a variety of justifications for special rules. To name a few,
insurers are repeat players with greater knowledge and sophistication about
insurance than consumers. Insurers understand more about risk and about
the nuances and complexities of coverage and non-coverage in the context
of endless factual uncertainties that may arise. Insurance contracts are
super-adhesionary; insurers have unilaterally and carefully drafted the
insurance policy, and are unwilling to negotiate the language of the
document. Most importantly, Fischer explains, insurers hold substantially
more information than insureds about nearly every aspect of insurance, and
can use this asymmetric possession of information to their advantage. a
Reasonable expectations, contra proferentum, estoppel, and most notably
the tort of bad faith are all judicial inventions aimed at leveling the playing
field for insureds.49 Likewise, for the other important intermediary in the
third-party insurance context, the defense attorney, courts have created
extraordinary safeguards to protect insureds.5 °
47 See James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special
Rules of Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 ARiz. ST. L.J. 995, 1049-50
(1992).
48 Id. at 1050-51.
49 See Hazel Glenn Beh, Reassessing the Sophisticated Insured Exception, 39
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRACT. L.J. 85, 85-86 (2004) (discussing justifications for pro-
insured canons of contract interpretation, "including the adhesive quality of the
insurance product, the parties' relative bargaining power, the relation of trust, the
parties' asymmetric access to information, the unique nature of insurance, and the
quasi-public nature of the insurance industry").
50 See, e.g., San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc.,
208 Cal. Rptr. 494, 496 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (allowing insured separate and
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The imbalance of knowledge, power, and sophistication that exists
between insureds and insurers is apparent between intermediaries and
insureds as well. Intermediaries are more like insurers than insureds: they
are repeat players in the insurance industry; they are equipped with
expertise, experience and a sophisticated knowledge of insurance; they
market products that insureds do not understand; they can exploit this
asymmetric possession of information to their advantage. Simply put,
insureds have no more savvy, knowledge, or power in the relationship with
their intermediary than they do with their insurer.
Despite the imbalances in the relationship between insureds and
intermediaries, case law often does not impose a particularly high standard
of care upon insurance intermediaries. Usually, courts do not regard these
intermediaries as fiduciaries and they are merely held liable under a
negligence theory. For some courts, it is the insured who bears most of the
risks associated with imperfect communications or failure to purchase
appropriate coverage. "[T]he majority of courts have placed the burden on
the client to know potential coverages and ask for a particular coverage"
rather than "requiring the agent to clarify the request and educate the
client."5'
A few courts have flirted with the notion that intermediaries,
particularly independent brokers, may be fiduciaries, on compelling facts52
independent counsel at insurer's expense in instances of conflict). Even
jurisdictions that do not require so-called "Cumis counsel" establish enhanced
obligations to govern both the attorney hired by the insurer and the insurer itself.
See Finley v. Home Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 1145, 1156-57 (Haw. 1998); see also Tank
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 715 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Wash. 1986).
51 Daniel Gregory Sakall, Note, Can the Public Really Count on Insurance
Agents to Advise Them? A Critique of the "Special Circumstances" Test, 42
ARIz. L. REv. 991, 1002 (2000).
52 See, e.g., Watkins v. HRRW, LLC, No. 3:05-00279, 2006 WL 3327659 at
*8 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 14, 2006) (a broker may be a fiduciary "if Plaintiff
establishes that: 1) that the transaction was not an ordinary arm's length, business
transaction; and 2) that the particular facts establish a confidential relationship had
been established" and that to establish a confidential relationship the plaintiff must
have "reposed confidence in the agent who exercised dominion and influence to
act for the plaintiff's benefit").
2009]
584 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2
or for particular tasks.53 Only a handful of jurisdictions have characterized
the broker relationship generally as fiduciary.54 Arizona has adopted a
professional standard of care, that requires brokers to "exercise reasonable
care, skill and diligence in carrying out the agent's duties .... ""
In spite of a handful of notable attempts to classify insurance
intermediaries as either professionals or fiduciaries, in most cases absent a
so-called "special relationship," the only duty the intermediary actually
53 See, e.g., Highlands Ins. Co. v. PRG Brokerage, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 2272
(GHB), 2004 WL 35439 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2004) (noting that in New York, a
broker is a fiduciary in narrow circumstances, specifically collecting and receiving
premiums); see also Philips v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 497 S.E.2d 325,
327 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (insurance agent is a fiduciary for the insured "with
respect to procuring insurance, correctly naming the insured in the policy, and
correctly advising the insured about the nature and extent of his coverage" but has
no fiduciary duty to advise insured in the absence of a request).
54 Illinois courts view the insured-broker relationship as fiduciary. However,
legislation limits broker liability. See DOD Tech. v. Mesirow Ins. Serv., 887
N.E.2d 1, 6 (I11. Ct. App. 2008) (insured stated a cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty for alleged misappropriation of premiums, an exception to statutory
immunity). In New Jersey, a broker's duties have been characterized as fiduciary:
Further, as a result of the special nature of their relationship, an insurance
broker owes a fiduciary duty towards its principal:
Any individual seeking insurance should be able to rely on the expertise of the
agent, regardless of the prior contract between the parties. The fiduciary nature of
such a relationship should not depend solely upon the length of the relationship.
Because of the increasing complexity of the insurance industry and the specialized
knowledge required to understand all of intricacies, the relationship between an
insurance agent and a client is often a fiduciary one.
In re Payroll Exp. Corp., Bankruptcy No. 92-B-43150 (CB), 2005 WL
2438444 at *17 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2005) (summarizing New Jersey law
and quoting Sobotor v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co.).
55Sw. Auto. Painting and Body Repair, Inc. v. Binsfeld, 904 P.2d 1268, 1271
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). See Shane Ham, Arizona Case Note, Webb v. Gittlen:
Assignability of Professional Negligence Claims Against Insurance Agents, 50
ARIz. L. REv. 647, 650-51 (2008) (observing that Arizona is in a minority of
jurisdictions elevating agents to a professional standard of care).
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owes the insured is to act reasonably to procure the specific policy the
16insured requests. It has proven difficult for insureds to establish that a
special relationship in fact existed. "A special relationship in the context of
insurance requires more than the ordinary insurer-insured relationship.""
The agent must take some affirmative step to elevate the relationship, such
as "hold[ing] himself or herself out as a highly skilled insurance expert, and
the insured relies to his detriment on that expertise. 58 It may "also be
demonstrated by a long term relationship of confidence, in which the agent
or broker assumes the duty to render advice, or has been asked to provide
advice, and the advisor is compensated accordingly, above and beyond the
premiums customarily earned.
59
Lewis-Williamson v. Grange Mutual Insurance Co.60 illustrates
judicial reticence to find a special relationship. There, the plaintiff, a 78-
year-old homeowner, had insured her home through Grange Mutual since
198 1.61 Beginning in 1991, plaintiff purchased her insurance through
Clute, an agent who wrote "property insurance exclusively for Grange
Insurance unless Grange Insurance d[id] not offer the requested insurance,
in which case Clute [wa]s authorized to seek coverage from another
insurance company.62 In 1996, when plaintiff's policy limits were
$200,000, she attended a Grange Hall meeting 63 and discussed her
56 Michael Childress et al., A Matter of Trust, 2005 CHI. B. Ass'N REC. 30,
32; Colin Sammon, Comment, Insurance Agent and Broker Liability: Crossing
the Two Way Street, 29 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 237, 242 (2002); Richmond, supra note
33, at 16.
57 Sadler v. Loomis Co., 776 A.2d 25, 35 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001).
58 Id.
Id.
6039 P.3d 947 (Or. App. 2000).
6 1 Id. at 948.
62 Id.
63 Grange Hall is a national social and community centered association for
farmers with local affiliates in rural communities. Importantly, Grange Mutual is
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insurance with Clute after the meeting. According to the court, Grange
Insurance was only available to Grange members and Clute discussed
insurance needs with members after the Grange meetings.
Plaintiff asked Clute to increase her insurance "to at least double"
and that she wanted "replacement cost."64 Focusing on the "casual nature
of the relationship," the court observed that Clute told plaintiff he would
"stop by," but did not make a formal appointment with her.65 Thereafter,
Clute did stop by when she was not there, and examined only the exterior
of her home. Intimidated by a large dog, Clute did not fully inspect the
home.66 Nevertheless, Clute did provide the plaintiff with advice. "Based
on his exterior inspection and a telephone conversation with plaintiff, Clute
recommended to plaintiff that she increase her coverage on the residence to
$510,000.,,67 Plaintiff followed his recommendation.
In 1998, plaintiff's residence was completely destroyed and
replacement costs were estimated at $700,000, well in excess of the insured
value.68 Plaintiff filed a negligence action against Clute, and against
Grange on vicarious liability. The court granted summary judgment in
favor of both defendants, and the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed.69
The court explained that, absent a special relationship, "an
insurance agent acting as an agent for the insured owes a general duty to
exercise reasonable skill and care in providing the requested insurance. 70
an insurer that focuses on the insurance needs of rural and farm communities.
HOOVER'S BASIC Co. REc., GRANGE MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY (2009); see
also Malcolm Trupp, Locally, Granges Thriving, THE REGISTER GUARD, May 20,
2008, at A7.
64 Lewis-Williamson, 39 P.3d at 950.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 948.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 949.
69 Id. at 948-49.
70 Lewis- Williamson, 39 P.3d at 949.
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The court acknowledged that plaintiff placed trust in Clute to advise her,
but distinguished between the factual trust plaintiff placed in Clute and
trust establishing a legal obligation to act in her interest. "The fact that she
trusted him and deferred to his judgment does not make him her agent or
show that he was acting on her behalf."7' The court continued, "[a]lthough
plaintiff trusted Clute to take care of her insurance needs, there is no
evidence that she had reason to expect, other than through her trusting
nature, that he would work on her economic behalf., 72 The court noted that
as a captive agent, Clute was Grange's agent, not hers, and had "been
available to her for her convenience by virtue of his presence at Grange
Hall meetings, but that was for the economic benefit of Grange and himself
and not plaintiff. 73
The result is troubling. A 78-year-old homeowner purchased an
inadequate amount of insurance through a mutual insurer who particularly
catered to rural clients, whose captive agent had purposely cultivated a
lengthy and trusted relationship, and who affirmatively offered faulty
advice. Yet in the court's view the insured was not reasonable to trust
Clute's advice.74
Id. at 950.
72 Id
Id.
74 The plaintiff would have been better off if Clute had advised her to obtain
an appraisal of the cost of replacement, rather than to suggest an amount. Had he
not wanted her to follow his advice, he could have easily warned her that it was
merely his own personal opinion or better yet, not rendered any advice at all.
Canales v. Wilson Southland Ins. Agency, 583 S.E.2d 203 (Ga. Ct. App.
2003), is equally disturbing. Canales, a customer of independent agent Wilson for
several years, sought automobile insurance to cover his vehicle in both the United
States and Mexico. Canales did not speak English, and brought an interpreter with
him to the insurance agency. After the insured vehicle was destroyed in Mexico,
the insurer denied the claim because driving in Mexico was excluded from
coverage. Canales filed suit against Wilson claiming Wilson did not procure the
proper insurance for Canales. At summary judgment, the fact of whether Wilson
expressly said the automobile policy would cover trips to Mexico was hotly
contested. Both the interpreter and Canales claimed Canales requested Mexico
coverage and that Wilson said the policy would cover driving in Mexico, while
Wilson denied the alleged statements. Id. at 204. On the other hand, it was
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B. THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN THE COMPLEXITY OF THE
PRODUCT AND CURRENT STANDARDS FOR INTERMEDIARY
LIABILITY
Lewis-Williamson illustrates the majority rule that, absent "special
circumstances," little is owed by an insurance intermediary to the insured.
It further illustrates judicial reluctance to find that special relationship, even
on quite compelling facts. This approach does not appropriately account
for the level of trust commonly placed in intermediaries or the lack of
sophistication and expertise common to insureds.75  Insurance
intermediaries are generally viewed as a sales force for insurers and
"something less than professionals '76 by the courts," despite the
importance and complexity of the product they sell.78 While courts may
undisputed that Canales, who did not read English, did not read the policy issued
nor have his interpreter read it to him. Canales also claimed that he relied on
Wilson to obtain appropriate insurance, that he trusted Wilson to advise him,
particularly because of their prior dealings and because Canales was
unsophisticated in matters of insurance. Id. at 204-205. Despite the contested
facts regarding what was said, Wilson obtained summary judgment, because the
language of the policy issued was clear and Canales had a duty to read the policy
or have someone read it to him. Id. The court observed, just because "two
people.. .have come to repose trust and confidence in each other as a result of such
dealings is not sufficient, in and of itself, to warrant a finding that a confidential
relationship exists between them." Id. at 205 (quotation marks omitted).
75 The special circumstances exception that many jurisdictions adhere to
requires the plaintiff insured to establish something more than an ordinary broker-
insured relationship, i.e., a factual basis for a heightened standard of care imposed
on the intermediary. See Richmond, supra note 33, at 27-28 (describing instances
where courts have found a special relationship). Yet, even when confronted with
special circumstances, courts seem reluctant to find the exception applies. As
Richmond observes, "special relationships are not lightly created." Id. at 27.
76 Sakall, supra note 51, at 1004.
77 Id. at 993.
78 Sakall, surveying approaches adopted by courts observed that the standard
of care set by courts is inappropriately low, and the special circumstances test
unwieldy. He argued that an Arizona approach is preferable. Under Arizona
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not regard intermediaries as professionals, intermediaries commonly
market themselves as professionals with expert knowledge that consumers
can trust.
79
Paradoxically, courts frequently have imposed unrealistically high
expectations on insureds in these transactions: to read and understand an
insurance policy, and to understand and communicate precisely their own
insurance needs.80 Insureds, both commercial and individual, are expected
to carefully research the purchase of insurance as they would the purchase
of any commodity, including checking with multiple sources and
comparing prices and benefits.8 Caveat emptor applies to the procurement
caselaw, Sakall explains that the duty of agents may include a duty to advise. He
writes:
The Arizona approach is preferable to the majority's "special circumstances"
test for a number of reasons. First, agents' duties do not turn on whether they are
company agents or brokers. All insurance agents are held to a general professional
duty. Second, an agent's liability turns not upon some dictate by the court but,
rather, upon the conduct of the agent's colleagues and a jury's determination. If
both their colleagues and a jury believe it reasonable for an agent not to have
advised a client, the agent will not be found liable. Third, agents gain some
certainty in knowing that they must keep up with industry customs rather than
hoping that a judge does not create some new type of "special circumstance."
Fourth, courts are open to clients who truly entrust their insurance concerns to their
agents and seek their agents' advice. Fifth, the Arizona approach does not decrease
judicial efficiency, as the "special circumstances" rule still requires a jury trial
before the judge can determine whether a duty exists. Finally, if a client's damages
are limited to the policy limits of a policy that should have been recommended,
there is no danger of subverting the fundamental purpose of insurance in allocating
risk.
Sakall, supra note 51, at 1013.
Id. at 1011.
80 In this regard, both sophisticated commercial insureds and unsophisticated
consumer insureds fare similarly. See, e.g., Wilmering v. Lexington Ins. Co., 678
S.W.2d 865, 872 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (finding no duty of insured's broker to
advise or explain "watchman" warranty to an insured corporate owners of a river
vessel purchasing marine insurance). In my view, Richmond also has
unrealistically heightened expectations of insureds. See Richmond, supra note 33,
at 33 ("[c]ommerical insureds are keenly attuned to deductible amounts and
issues").
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of insurance.82 Notably, the brokerage houses involved in the Spitzer
investigation dealt with large commercial insureds. Yet even these highly
sophisticated insureds were unable to discern whether they were obtaining
the services they needed at a fair price. It begs the question, if even
business savvy commercial insureds are unable to protect their interests,
how can we expect personal insurance consumers to guard against their
agents' undisclosed financial motives without safeguards?
Judicial reluctance to impose a professional standard of care on
intermediaries ignores the realities that insurance products are so complex,
the customers so unsophisticated, and the bargaining aspects so one-sided
that insureds deserve special advantages to level the field. The market for
intermediaries exists because of the complexity and incomprehensibility of
insurance policies. Even sophisticated insureds must seek the counsel and
advice of an intermediary to understand what they are purchasing.83
Nevertheless, despite the fact that courts understand the vulnerabilities of
the insured and protect them in other aspects of the insurance transaction,
they neglect a principled approach of imposing a professional standard of
care on intermediaries. A heightened standard of care better protects
insureds and acknowledges the trust intermediaries nurture, expertise they
possess, and the advice they provide.
III. INSURANCE INTERMEDIARY COMPENSATION
On October 14, 2004, then New York Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer filed a complaint against one of the world's largest insurance
brokers, Marsh and McLennan, alleging that the compensation scheme
between it and certain insurance companies constituted fraudulent business
practices. 84 The suit alleged that Marsh improperly steered its customer
81 Richmond, supra note 33, at 12, (citing Weisblatt v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 4 F. Supp. 2d 371, 382 (E.D. Pa. 1998)).
82 Id.
83 Beh, supra note 49, at 94, 97-98.
84 See generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 7, at 3041 (recounting events and
repercussions of the New York lawsuits and investigations). See also In re Marsh
ERISA Litigation, No. 04 Civ. 8157(SWK), 2006 WL 370169 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14,
2006). Insurers were also targeted in the Spitzer investigation. For example, Aon
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business to insurers in order to take advantage of Marsh's commission
structure with these insurers. The suit alleged that the compensation
agreements Marsh had developed with key insurers created an incentive for
Marsh to steer business to insurers that paid maximum contingent
commissions, regardless of whether those insurers offered the most
competitive rates to Marsh's clients. The suit raised the question of
whether the compensation scheme between insurers and intermediaries
created insurmountable conflicts of interest between insureds, insurers, and
their intermediaries."5
A. CONTINGENT COMMISSIONS
Independent agents and exclusive agents both typically earn
compensation through commissions paid by insurers.8 6 Brokers, who are
selected by insureds to provide broader risk management assessment than
simply placing insurance, earn commissions for the insurance they place,
even while charging fees to insureds for other services.8 7
It has been "a familiar and public feature of the insurance market"
88
to also pay "contingent commissions"8 9 to intermediaries, and it is these
Corporation eventually settled with the State of New York, apologized for
participating in contingent commission steering schemes, and established a fund
for insured claimants. See Piven v. Ryan, No. 05 CV 4619, 2006 WL 756043, at
*1 (N.D. I11. Mar. 23, 2006).
85 While attention was largely directed at large commercial brokers, such as
Marsh and Willis, in fact contingent commissions were common compensation
schemes with brokers of all sizes. Fitzpatrick, supra note 7, at 3045, 3056-57.
86 See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 379. Cummins and Doherty
also observe that "[s]ome intermediaries also receive noncash compensation from
insurers" to reward "superior performance." Id. at 379, n. 17.
87 Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 379.
88 Fitzpatrick, supra note 7, at 3049.
89Id. The practice of paying commissions based upon profitability is not new.
See, e.g., Harris & Spear, Inc. v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co. of Milwaukee, 68 F.2d 63
(9th Cir. 1933) (describing terms of a 1922 broker contract with an insured: "By
the terms of the contract the said general agents or managers were allowed 'a flat
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types of commissions, more so than commissions based solely on
premiums, that have drawn criticism. Contingent commissions are
typically earned based on the intermediary's profitability to the insurer.9°
"Typically, contingent commissions are based on the profitability of the
intermediary's business placed with the insurer, the persistency rate, and/or
on the volume of business." 91
Contingent commission compensation structures vary from insurer
to insurer, even between intermediaries for the same insurer, and from line
to line.92 They may be contingent on volume sold, i.e., the intermediary
receives a commission based on reaching certain volumes; or they may be
profit based, i.e., the intermediary receives a commission based on factors
such as claims filed on a policy.93
Contingent commissions reward intermediaries for meeting profit
aims of the insurer. Until recently, there was no obligation or practice that
encouraged intermediaries to disclose the manner or amount of
compensation they earned from the insurer to the insured.94
commission of thirty-five per cent of the net premiums written,' and, in addition
thereto, 'a contingent commission of fifteen (15) per cent of the net profits of the
business under their charge, said profits to be computed as of the 31st day of
December, 1923, and annually thereafter on the business of each 'single' year so
long as this agreement shall continue."). An agreement between a broker and an
insurer from the 1980's described the contingent commission as based on 25% of
the "[n]et underwriting profit" described as "the excess of income to plaintiff
[insurance company] over outgo from plaintiff." Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Risk Exchange, Inc., No. 86 Civ. 7461 (MJL), 1990 WL 210258
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1990).
90 Regan & Tennyson, supra note 14, at 648-50.
91 Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 379. See Roth v. AON Corp., 2008
WL 65069 at *1 (N.D. I11. Mar. 7, 2008) ("'contingent commissions' refers to a
practice in which brokers such as Aon received payments from insurers based on
the overall volume or profitability of business that brokers placed with those
insurers.").
92 Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 379.
Id.
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The perceived problem with contingent commissions is that
intermediaries earned additional and different commissions based upon
where they placed an insured's business.95  Some assert that these
commissions create an irreconcilable conflict between the intermediary and
the insured because the intermediary's self interest in compensation may
not be aligned with the insured's interest in obtaining the best insurance for
their needs at the best price.96 The variability in compensation between
insurers and the availability of contingent commissions tend to pit the
insured's interests against the intermediary's own financial interests, while
the lack of disclosure makes it unlikely that insureds would be able to
protect themselves.
Contingent commissions may force the intermediary to choose
between their own desire to enhance their income and their responsibility to
place the insured with the insurer and policy most ideally suited to meet the
insured's needs. This type of commission creates the risk of "steering,"
where the insured is placed with the insurer that provides the best
commission rather than the best policy for the insured.97  Contingent
94 Douglas Richmond argues that intermediaries do not have any duty to
disclose their compensation to insureds. Richmond, supra note 33, at 35-36. He
argues that the competitive marketplace and other market forces, state regulation,
impracticalities, and its attenuated effect on premiums favor a no duty to disclose
compensation rule. Id.
95 The intermediary's value to the insurer is the fact that they own their client
lists. "Agent ownership of policy expirations means that the insurance provider
has no legal right to solicit an independent agent's clients directly or to replace the
agent and assign his customers to another agent." Regan & Tennyson, supra note
14, at 640. When a policy is first placed or later renewed, an agent earns a
"premium based commission." Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 375. This
is "a commission which is a proportion of premium volume." Regan & Tennyson,
supra note 14, at 648. Some insurers only pay premium-based commissions.
Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 375.
96 Schwarcz, supra note 3.
97 Id. at 297. See Jeffrey Wilder, Competing for the Effort of a Common
Agent: Contingency Fees in Commercial Lines Insurance (U.S. Dep't of Just.,
Antitrust Div., Econ. Analysis Group, Working Paper No. EAG03-4, 2004),
available at http://irm.wharton.upenn.edu/S02-Wilder.pdf. The study found that
contingency fees affect where brokers place their customers in several ways.
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commissions may also serve to limit the intermediary's drive to search for
low prices and bargains.98 If the intermediary chooses to prioritize "their
receipt of contingent commissions over their market-matching role," their
customers may receive suboptimal insurance, or a much more expensive
policy than their needs dictate. 99
B. REPONSES TO CONTINGENT COMMISSIONS
Different schools of thought exist regarding the best way to
counteract the harmful effects of contingent commissions. Some are
convinced that contingent commissions are efficient and do not harm
insureds.' ° For those who view contingent commissions as benign, a
solution to calm fears is to permit contingent commissions but require
Brokers receiving contingency fees are more likely to place new customers with
insurers offering contingency fees, they are less likely to move renewing insureds
to non-contingency fee paying insurers, and they are less likely to place customers
with insurers "for which contingency fee contracts have been 'swamped' by past
losses and are unlikely to pay contingency fees in the current year." Id.
98 Victor P. Goldberg & Richard A. Epstein, Introductory Remarks: Some
Reflections on Two-Sided Markets and Pricing, 2005 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 509,
512 (2005).
99 Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 878. Recently, an Illinois Appellate Court
recognized that an allegation that the broker's undisclosed contingent commissions
"led [the broker] to place certain policies for the customer's needs" could state a
claim for misappropriation of premiums. DOD Tech. v. Mesirow Ins. Servs., Inc.,
887 N.E.2d 1, 8 (I11. App. 3d 2008). On the other hand, Richmond takes the view
that intermediaries have no duty to disclose and that no cause of action for failure
to disclose contingent commissions is viable. Richmond, supra note 33, at 33.
Richmond contends that claims based on a failure to disclose commissions are ill-
conceived. Id. He writes, "[b]oth agents and brokers are entitled to what the
insurance industry considers to be reasonable compensation for their services, even
if cost-conscious insureds think otherwise." Id. at 36. However, in our view,
Richmond does not adequately consider the allegation of self-motivated steering..
100 See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 360 ("Although contingent
commissions, like most business practices, can be misused by the unscrupulous, in
general such compensation plans play an important role in aligning incentives
between buyers and insurers and thus facilitate the efficient operation of insurance
markets.")
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disclosure of the compensation scheme by which they are earned.
Proponents of contingent commissions view disclosure as a compromise
that would enable insurance customers to make informed decisions. 10
Opponents of contingent commission argue that disclosure alone
cannot correct the fundamental unfairness in the marketplace that
contingent commissions exacerbate. For them, nothing short of banning
contingent commissions altogether will suffice. 0 2 Notably, New York's
investigation involved extremely sophisticated insureds, employing and
paying for the services of one of the largest brokerage firms in the world.
Yet they were unaware of potential conflict posed by contingent
commissions or the steering that might or did occur at their expense.'0 3
Full disclosure might have helped them to negotiate a clearer deal with
their brokers, but only if they had true choices. Arguably, in a concentrated
broker market they may not have had choices. Disclosure cannot protect
insureds in the consumer or smaller markets, where there is little ability to
negotiate a different arrangement. Thus, Schwarcz's position is
particularly compelling in the personal lines market.
IV. OTHER INSURANCE INTERMEDIARIES
Insureds at least know that an intermediary is brokering the
procurement of insurance; however Professor Stempel writes about
intermediaries of whom insureds know far less.1 4 These intermediaries are
employed by insurers after the contract has been formed and do work on
behalf of the insurer. Many of the functions undertaken by these
101 Fitzpatrick, supra note 7, at 3067-71 (citing "transparency" as the key to
the problem posed by contingent commissions).
102 Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 878.
103 Joseph B. Treaster, Connecticut Suit Says Marsh and Insurer Misled State,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2005, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/22/business/22insure.html("Clients paid Marsh
a fee or commission for unbiased recommendations and, according to the lawsuit,
were often unaware of the incentive payments").
104 Stempel, supra note 2, at 741.
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intermediaries are those that have traditionally been in-house operational
functions, such as underwriting, adjusting, and claim-handling. 0 5
The issue concerning these intermediaries is not for whom they
work or where their loyalties lie. We know that downstream intermediaries
work for the insurer. The issue here is whether it better protects insureds
and serves the public good to subject these intermediaries to tort liability
when their actions harm insureds. If they act as agents for the insurer, is it
sufficient that the insured can pursue a claim against that insurer, or would
it be advantageous to allow an independent claim against the intermediary
as well?
Lack of privity between the insured and these intermediaries
generally has made them untouchable, under either tort or third party
beneficiary theories. Stempel notes that the prevailing view is that there is
not a pressing need to create a cause of action because the insured can
adequately vindicate claims by suing the insurer, who should be liable as
the principal. 10 6 He complains that it is unfair to use the barrier of privity
to preclude tort liability. 10 7 After all, in these instances the intermediary
usually deals directly with the insured, and even if they are not in privity,
the insured is obviously a foreseeable plaintiff. Insulating a tortfeasor for
its own conduct toward a foreseeable plaintiff, simply on the grounds of
privity, undermines basic tort principles.
Stempel argues that these intermediaries should be subject to
potential liability.' 0 Among other reasons, he observes that potential
105 Independent adjusters are independent contractors who work for insurers
and self-insurers to investigate and adjust claims. Public adjusters, on the other
hand, work for insureds to help them present their claim. See, e.g., Hammill v.
Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co., 892 A.2d 226, 232 (Vt. 2005) (explaining that
independent adjusters works "in behalf of the insurer" and public adjuster works
"in behalf of insured"); Benjamin v. Thomas Howell Group, No. Civ.1996-071,
2002 WL 31573004, at *2 (D.Virgin Islands Apr. 22, 2002) (explaining that a
public adjuster works on behalf of the insured, while an independent adjuster
"represent[s] the interests of the insurer"). See also NY Adjusters: Who We Are,
http://www.nyadjusters.org/Who weare/who-we-are.html.
106 Stempel, supra note 2, at 547.
107 Id.
108 See id.
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liability to insureds will make intermediaries more directly accountable for
their wrongdoing, and that in and of itself advances societal interests. He
also notes we cannot count on insurers to always have the ability or
incentive to police the conduct of intermediaries who are authorized to act
on their behalf, because these intermediaries often function in capacities
beyond the tight control of the insurer, operating with some independence
and autonomy. 1°9  The public policy interests that legitimate claims be
promptly investigated and paid, and that unfounded claims be denied are
better served by holding those who impede those interests to account. Each
cog that carries out the functions that facilitate the proper administration of
insurance should bear the attendant liability. Finally, insureds here are just
as peculiarly vulnerable as they are in all other aspects of insurance
transactions. Downstream intermediaries stand between insureds and the
insurer who owes a duty to investigate, process, and pay claims honestly
and expeditiously. The insured has little power to leverage here, except
what power judicially constructed protections can provide.
CONCLUSION
Several dominant themes emerge in the examination of insurance
intermediaries that lead to a single conclusion. First, the public knows little
about the intermediary who sells them a product or processes or
investigates their claims on behalf of insurers. In the case of intermediaries
brokering insurance, fundamental questions include: Who does he work
for? To whom does he owe his allegiance? Who is paying him? Is he a
professional or a salesperson? What recourse is there if he fails to carry out
his duties? In the case of downstream intermediaries, similar questions
arise, such as: What independent responsibilities and liabilities to the
insured does he shoulder for his negligence? That these basic questions are
so difficult to answer should compel us to re-think how we regard the
intermediary.
The second theme is how relatively low the standard of care is for
intermediaries considering the important work they do to facilitate the
insured-insurer relationship. The law has established special contract and
tort principles to judge the conduct of insurers. It has done so because it
recognizes the peculiar vulnerabilities of insureds and strengths of insurers.
The insured is just as vulnerable in dealings with intermediaries, and
intermediaries share similar strengths with insurers. Intermediaries also
109 Stempel, supra note 2, at 547.
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operate in a complex world where insurers and insureds do not share a
common language. Intermediaries know a lot about insurance and have an
important role in the interface between insureds and insurers but they also
have competing interests that are unknown to insureds.
Courts have been champions of insureds when it comes to policing
the relationship between insurers and insureds. Courts often favor insureds
in the interpretation of insurance contracts; courts construct contractual and
tort claims to restrain overbearing conduct, and courts place heightened
duties on attorneys who represent insureds at the behest of insurers.
Curiously, courts have paid scant attention to the important role of
intermediaries in the insurance transaction, and have barely considered
whether this to is an area that needs judicial vigilance. It is therefore an
opportune time for all of us to examine more closely these important and
mysterious middlemen and develop a more principled approach.
